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1. Introduction
Most models in the market microstructure literature (see [16] for a survey)
consider linear equilibria. As argued by Bagnoli, Viswanathan and Holden
[1] it is thus important to understand the conditions under which such linear
equilibria exist. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this task in
the context of a Kyle-type model [12] with multiple, symmetrically informed
strategic traders. In our model there areN risk-neutral strategic traders who
observe the payoff of a risky asset before submitting market orders. In addi-
tion there are exogenous market orders (noise trade). Risk-neutral market
makers observe the aggregate net order flow, choose prices and then execute
every order. Throughout the paper we assume that the exogenous random
variables—asset payoff and noise trade—have finite second moments.
Under the additional assumption that asset payoff and noise trade are
independent Bagnoli, Viswanathan and Holden [1] show that in this model
a linear equilibrium exists for any number N of strategic traders if and only
if the joint distribution of the exogenous random variables is normal.1
We ask whether a similar characterization can be obtained without im-
posing the independence assumption. To motivate this question we observe,
first, that Foster and Viswanathan [9] have shown that relaxing the in-
dependence assumption is essential in generating phenomena such as the
dependence of price volatility and trading volume on the arrival of news in
the context of a Kyle-type model. Second, while it may seem natural to
assume that “pure” noise trading and asset payoff are independent, in the
context of the Kyle-model noise trading should be interpreted as the aggre-
gate market order of all traders whose strategic behavior is not explicitly
taken into account. From this perspective we see no compelling justification
why noise trade and payoff must be independent.2
Foster and Viswanathan [9] show that a linear equilibrium exists for any
number of strategic traders if the joint distribution of the exogenous random
variables is elliptical.3 For the case in which asset payoff and noise trade are
1[1] derive this result under an additional technical condition on the characteristic
function of the random variables. No¨ldeke and Tro¨ger [14] show that this condition can
be dispensed with and that normality is already implied by requiring the existence of
linear equilibria for two different numbers of strategic traders.
2Suppose, for instance, that noise trading is viewed as arising from liquidity shocks.
While it seems reasonable to suppose that such liquidity shocks have an idiosyncratic
component, it seems equally reasonable to suppose that they also have a component de-
termined by economic fundamentals also affecting the payoff of the risky asset, invalidating
the independence assumption.
3A multivariate random variable has an elliptical distribution if it is an affine trans-
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independent the result from Bagnoli, Viswanathan and Holden [1] implies
the reverse (because normal distributions are the only elliptical distributions
satisfying the independence condition), i.e. the ellipticity condition is tight
for the independent case. Here we show that the same is true more gener-
ally, that is without assuming independence of asset payoff and noise trade,
provided the additional condition is satisfied that the joint distribution of
the exogenous random variables is determined by its moments. The spirit
of this result is similar to Chamberlain [6] who obtains a characterization
of elliptical distributions as those that imply mean-variance preferences in
a standard portfolio problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the extension of the Kyle-model to the case of N strategic traders. Section 3
introduces the definition of linear equilibrium that we employ in this paper
and provides a preliminary necessary and sufficient condition for their exis-
tence. Section 4 establishes our characterization of elliptical distributions by
connecting the necessary and sufficient condition from the previous section
to the rotation invariance of the distribution of the standardized exogenous
random variables. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
The model extends the single auction setting considered in Kyle ([12], Sec-
tion 2) by allowing for multiple strategic traders as in [1] and [14]. There
are three types of traders: noise traders, risk neutral market makers, and
N ≥ 1 risk neutral strategic traders. The aggregate quantity traded by
noise traders and the payoff of the risky asset are given by exogenous ran-
dom variables. Noise trading is denoted by u˜. The payoff of the risky asset
is denoted by v˜.
We do not assume that u˜ and v˜ are independent, but maintain the as-
sumption that noise trade and asset payoff are uncorrelated.4 In addition,
we assume that these random variables have strictly positive, finite second
moments.5
formation of a random variable with a rotation invariant distribution. See Section 4 for
formal definitions and [8] for a detailed exposition. [9] presents many examples of elliptical
distributions and provides references to applications in financial economics.
4This assumption is made to ease comparison with the existing literature. As we argue
in Appendix B our results do not require it.
5The assumption that second moments are finite is necessary for a linear equilibrium
as defined below to exist - otherwise the expected payoff of a strategic trader would be
infinite.
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Assumption 1 The distribution of (u˜, v˜) has finite second moments satis-
fying σ2u = V ar[u˜] > 0, σ
2
v = V ar[v˜] > 0, and Cov[u˜, v˜] = 0.
All strategic traders observe the realization of v˜, but not of u˜, and then
simultaneously decide on the market order they submit. A strategy for the
strategic trader n = 1, · · · , N is given by a Lebesgue measurable function
Xn : IR → IR, determining his market order as a function of the observed
payoff. For a given strategy Xn, let x˜n = Xn(v˜). A strategy combination
(X1, · · · , XN ) determines the order flow as y˜ =∑n x˜n + u˜.
Market makers observe the realization of the order flow, but not any of
its components, and engage in a competitive auction to serve the order flow.
The outcome of this competition is described by a Lebesgue measurable
function P : IR → IR, called the pricing rule. Given (P,X1, · · · , XN ) define
p˜ = P (y˜) and let p˜in = (v˜ − p˜)x˜n denote the resulting profit of trader n.
To ensure that the expected profit of a strategic trader is well-defined for
all feasible (P,X1, · · · , XN ), we restrict the strategy set of a strategic trader
to X = {Xn : IR → IR | E[x˜2n] < ∞} and the set of pricing rules to
P = {P | ∀(X1, · · · , XN ) ∈ XN : E[p˜2] <∞}.
The equilibrium conditions are that the competition between market
makers drives their expected profits to zero conditional on the order flow
and that each strategic trader chooses his trading strategy to maximize his
expected profits.
Definition 1 (P,X1, · · · , XN ) ∈ P × XN is an equilibrium if
E[v˜ − p˜|y˜] = 0 (1)
and, for all n and X ∈ X ,
E[p˜in] ≥ E[(v˜ − P (
∑
m6=n
x˜m +X(v˜) + u˜))X(v˜)]. (2)
3. Linear Equilibria
The convention in the literature is to call an equilibrium linear if the pric-
ing rule is an affine function. In the following definition we add a linearity
requirement on the aggregate market order of the strategic traders. Given
the motivation for the study of linear equilibria, namely to obtain simple
closed-form expressions for equilibria, we find it natural to focus on equi-
libria satisfying this additional linearity requirement. When the exogenous
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random variables are independent this additional requirement is redundant
because it is implied by linearity of the pricing rule.6
Definition 2 An equilibrium (P,X1, · · · , XN ) is linear if there exist (µ, λ) ∈
IR2 such that
∀y : P (y) = µ+ λy (3)
and (α, β) ∈ IR2 such that ∑
n
x˜n = α+ βv˜. (4)
For the case in which u˜ and v˜ are independent [1] have shown that
the parameters describing a linear equilibrium (if it exists) are uniquely
determined and depend only on the number of strategic traders and the
first two moments of the distribution. We begin our analysis by showing
that the same characterization applies under Assumption 1. Towards this
end let
λN =
√
N
N + 1
σv
σu
, µN = E[v˜]− λNE[u˜], (5)
and
αN = −
√
N
σu
σv
E[v˜], βN =
√
N
σu
σv
. (6)
Proposition 1 If (P,X1, · · ·XN ) is a linear equilibrium then
y˜ = y˜N ≡ αN + βN v˜ + u˜ (7)
and
p˜ = p˜N ≡ µN + λN y˜N . (8)
The proof of Proposition 1 begins by assuming a linear pricing rule and
solving for the aggregate market order of the strategic traders implied by
(2). The linearity requirement (4) then implies E[u˜|v˜] = E[u˜] and we obtain
the order flow y˜ and the price p˜ as affine functions of the exogenous random
variables. The argument is completed by noting that due to the market
efficiency condition (1) every equilibrium must satisfy the condition that
6More generally, it is easy to see (cf. the proof of Proposition 1) that the additional
requirement is redundant if u˜ and v˜ are not only uncorrelated but satisfy E[u˜|v˜] = E[u˜].
This is similar to the sufficient conditions for the existence of a linear equilibrium imposed
by [1] in the context of a Kyle-type model with differentially informed strategic traders.
It remains an open question whether equilibria with a linear pricing rule exist if u˜ and v˜
are uncorrelated and the condition E[u˜|v˜] = E[u˜] is violated.
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the forecast error v˜ − p˜ has zero expectation and is uncorrelated with the
order flow y˜. This provides two equations that can be used to verify that
λ = λN and µ = µN , hence (8). Substituting the expressions from (5) into
the order flow yields (7).
This proof makes clear that to characterize linear equilibria the equi-
librium condition (1) is not fully exploited. The proof only uses that the
forecast error v˜ − p˜ has expectation 0 and is uncorrelated with the order
flow. To find a necessary condition for the existence of a linear equilibrium
for all N we fully exploit (1), namely that the expectation of the forecast
error equals 0 conditional on the observation of the order flow; i.e.,
E[v˜ − p˜N |y˜N ] = 0 ∀N ∈ IN. (9)
This provides a condition on the joint distribution of (u˜, v˜). It will be con-
venient to write this condition in terms of standardized random variables.
Let
u˜∗ =
u˜− E[u˜]
σu
, v˜∗ =
v˜ − E[v˜]
σv
denote the standardization of the random variables (u˜, v˜). Straightforward
algebra shows that (9) is equivalent to
E
[
−
√
N√
N + 1
u˜∗ +
1√
N + 1
v˜∗
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√N + 1 u˜∗ +
√
N√
N + 1
v˜∗
]
= 0 ∀N ∈ IN.
(10)
It should be clear from the above discussion that (10) is necessary for the
existence of a linear equilibrium for all N . The proof of the following propo-
sition shows that (10) is also sufficient. Establishing this is more subtle
because it involves the demonstration that (4) is implied if (10) holds.
Proposition 2 A linear equilibrium exists for all N ∈ IN if and only if (10)
holds.
The characterization result in Proposition 2 is identical to the one we
have established for the case of independent u˜ and v˜ in our previous paper
[14]. In [14] we also show that under the independence assumption condi-
tion (10) is equivalent to normality of the joint distribution of (u˜, v˜). It is
clear that this characterization fails without the independence assumption
because it is known (cf. [9]) that the ellipticity of the joint distribution of
(u˜, v˜) is sufficient for the existence of linear equilibria for all N . In the fol-
lowing we thus investigate the question whether ellipticity of the distribution
of (u˜, v˜) is also necessary for (10).
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4. Rotation Invariance and Ellipticity
For all η ∈ (0, 2pi), let (u˜∗η, v˜∗η) denote the bivariate random variable obtained
from a rotation of (u˜∗, v˜∗) by the angle η around the origin, i.e.
(u˜∗η, v˜
∗
η) = (cos ηu˜
∗ + sin ηv˜∗,− sin ηu˜∗ + cos ηv˜∗). (11)
Definition 3 (Cf. [8]) The distribution of (u˜, v˜) satisfying Assumption 1 is
elliptical if the distribution of (u˜∗, v˜∗) is rotation invariant. The distribution
of (u˜∗, v˜∗) is rotation invariant if for all η ∈ (0, 2pi) the random variable
(u˜∗η, v˜∗η) has the same distribution as (u˜∗, v˜∗).
Rewriting (10) as
E[v˜∗η|u˜∗η] = 0 ∀η ∈ A, (12)
where
A =
{
η ∈ (0, 2pi) | ∃N ∈ IN :
√
N√
N + 1
= sin η
}
,
suggests that (10) is closely related to the condition that (u˜∗, v˜∗) is rotation
invariant. Indeed, if one replaces the set A in (12) by the full set of an-
gles (0, 2pi) then one obtains a condition that is equivalent to the rotation
invariance of (u˜∗, v˜∗) and thus the ellipticity of (u˜, v˜).
Remark 1 The distribution of (u˜, v˜) is elliptical if and only if
E[v˜∗η|u˜∗η] = 0, ∀η ∈ (0, 2pi). (13)
The proof is similar to an argument used in Hardin’s [11] characterization of
distributions satisfying the linear regression property. It shows that (13) is
equivalent to the condition that the derivative of the characteristic function
of (u˜∗, v˜∗) with respect to the polar angle equals zero, implying rotation
invariance.
Because condition (13) implies (12), the result that a linear equilibrium
exists for all N ∈ IN if the distribution of (u˜, v˜) is elliptical is an immediate
consequence of Proposition 2 and Remark 1. The difficulty with establishing
the reverse conclusion is that the set A appearing in condition (12) only con-
tains isolated points with a single limit point. I.e., condition (12) provides
much less information than (13). More precisely, the condition that the
derivative of the characteristic function of (u˜∗, v˜∗) with respect to the polar
angle equals zero is implied by (12) only for a countable set of isolated lines
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through the origin, precluding the possibility to obtain the rotation invari-
ance of the characteristic function (and hence the distribution) of (u˜∗, v˜∗)
from (12) alone. As we show in the proof of the following proposition the
conditions are, however, sufficiently rich to demonstrate the rotation invari-
ance of the partial derivatives of the characteristic function in the origin.
Assuming that all moments of the distribution of (u˜∗, v˜∗) are finite, these
partial derivatives determine the moments of the distribution, and we can
conclude that the moments are rotation invariant.7
Proposition 3 Suppose condition (12) holds and all moments of (u˜∗, v˜∗)
are finite. Then the moments of (u˜∗, v˜∗) are rotation invariant, that is for all
η ∈ (0, 2pi) the random variable (u˜∗η, v˜∗η) has the same moments as (u˜∗, v˜∗).
It is clear that if the distribution of (u˜∗, v˜∗) is determined by its mo-
ments, i.e. if all moments of the distribution are finite and there exists no
other distribution with the same moments, then rotation invariance of the
moments implies rotation invariance of the distribution. Because the distri-
bution of (u˜, v˜) is determined by its moments if and only if the same is true
for the distribution of (u˜∗, v˜∗) we have thus established:
Theorem 1 Suppose the joint distribution of (u˜, v˜) is determined by its
moments and a linear equilibrium exists for all N ∈ IN. Then the distribution
of (u˜, v˜) is elliptical.
We note that the condition that the joint distribution of (u˜∗, v˜∗) is de-
termined by its moments is indispensable to obtain Theorem 1 from Propo-
sition 3: given any rotation invariant distribution that is not determined by
its moments, one can construct a distribution with the same moments that
is not rotation invariant.8 Hence, to extend Theorem 1 to a larger class of
7The general idea of deriving properties of the moments from properties of the charac-
teristic function along a countable set of lines through the origin already appears in Gilbert
[10], albeit in a different context. Gilbert shows that the moments of a two-dimensional
distribution are determined by the moments of any infinite set of one-dimensional projec-
tions of the distribution.
8 Any rotation invariant distribution F can be decomposed into two independent dis-
tributions: the uniform distribution over directions in the plane, and a distribution G over
Euclidian distances from the origin. In this decomposition any distribution over Euclidian
distances can be used, so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between distributions
G on [0,∞) and the set of rotation invariant distributions F . Berg and Thill [3] show that
G is determined by its moments only if F is. Hence, assuming that F is not determined
by its moments, there exists a distribution G′ over Euclidian distances from the origin
such that G′ 6= G and G′ has the same moments as G. Define a distribution F ′ by the
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elliptical distributions one would need to use implications of the equilibrium
conditions that go beyond the rotation invariance of the moments, which
appears difficult even under the assumption that all moments are finite.9
It is clear, though, that Theorem 1 applies under any primitive assump-
tion on the distribution function which, in conjunction with the equilibrium
conditions, implies that the joint distribution of (u˜, v˜) is determined by its
moments. For instance, supposing that all moments are finite and that one
of the marginal distributions is determined by its moments will do:10 from
Proposition 3 it then follows that both marginal distributions are determined
by their moments which suffices to conclude that the joint distribution is
determined by its moments [17]. Because there exist elliptical distributions
that are not determined by their moments (cf. footnote 8) it is also clear
that such an approach will not yield a full characterization of the elliptical
class. This is in contrast to the case in which u˜ and v˜ are independent,
where the equilibrium conditions alone imply that the joint distribution of
(u˜, v˜) is determined by its moments (cf. the proof of Proposition 2 in [14]).
5. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that existence of linear equilibria in a Kyle-type model
with multiple strategic traders implies that the joint distribution of asset
payoff and noise trade is elliptical if this distribution is determined by its
moments. As we have explained, the assumption that the joint distribution
is determined by its moments is restrictive and, unfortunately, not easy
to relax. The assumption does, however, hold in many cases of interest.
For instance, any distribution that has a moment generating function in
a neighborhood of zero is determined by its moments; in particular, the
assumption holds if the distribution has bounded support. More generally,
following sampling procedure. A direction in the plane is chosen according to the uniform
distribution; if the angle falls into the interval [0, pi], a distance from the origin is chosen
according to G; otherwise, a distance from the origin is chosen according to G′. It is
straightforward to verify that F ′ has the same moments as F . The distribution F ′ is, of
course, not rotation invariant.
9Recall that the equilibrium conditions are equivalent to conditions on the character-
istic function of (u˜∗, v˜∗) along a countable set of isolated lines through the origin. Be´lisle,
Masse´, and Ransford [4] show that there exist two different 2-dimensional distributions
that have the same finite moments and identical characteristic functions along an infinite
set of lines through the origin.
10Note that this assumption is neither implied by (not even if the joint distribution is
known to be rotation invariant) nor (without rotation invariance of the moments) implies
the assumption that the joint distribution is determined by its moments, cf. [2].
9
Crame´r and Wold [7] show (see also Shohat and Tamarkin [19]) that the
distribution of (u˜, v˜) is determined by its moments if the following two-
dimensional extension of the Carleman condition holds:
∞∑
k=1
(E[v˜2k] + E[u˜2k])−1/2k =∞.
For more recent results on the multidimensional problem of moments we
refer to Berg [2].
In a previous version of this paper [15] we have shown that our main
characterization result also holds in the Rochet-Vila [18] model of market
making with multiple strategic traders. Because in the Rochet-Vila model
the strategic traders observe the noise trade before submitting their orders,
the analysis is somewhat simpler and Theorem 1 holds without imposing
linearity of the strategic traders’ aggregate order.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose (P,X1, · · · , XN ) is a linear equilibrium
with P (y) = µ + λy. Because Xn(v) is an equilibrium strategy and thus
satisfies (2):
Xn(v) ∈ argmax
x
v − µ− λ(∑
m6=n
Xm(v) + x+ E[u˜|v˜ = v])
x a.e. v.
Because v˜ is non-degenerate this condition can only be satisfied if λ > 0.
For λ > 0 the first order condition characterizes a maximum and yields
∀n : v˜ − µ− λ
(∑
m
x˜m + x˜n + E[u˜|v˜]
)
= 0.
Hence, x˜n is independent of n and thus∑
n
x˜n =
N(v˜ − µ− λE[u˜|v˜])
λ(N + 1)
. (14)
This together with (4) implies that E[u˜|v˜] is an affine function of v˜. From
the assumption that u˜ and v˜ are uncorrelated, it is then straightforward that
E[u˜|v˜] = E[u˜]. Consequently, (14) implies that the order flow is given by
y˜ =
N(v˜ − µ− λE[u˜])
λ(N + 1)
+ u˜ (15)
and thus
p˜ =
N(v˜ − λE[u˜]) + µ
N + 1
+ λu˜. (16)
The market efficiency condition (1) implies
E[v˜ − p˜] = 0 (17)
and
E[(v˜ − p˜)y˜] = 0. (18)
Using (16) and (17) we obtain
µ = E[v˜]− λE[u˜]. (19)
Using (19) to eliminate µ from equations (15) and (16), formula (18) together
with the fact that u˜ and v˜ are uncorrelated yields λ = λN . Hence, µ = µN
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follows from (19). Finally, substituting λ = λN and µ = µN into (15) yields
(7).
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove sufficiency of (10) define strategies Xn
and a pricing rule P by
Xn(v) =
αN
N
+
βN
N
v, P (y) = µN + λNy.
Straightforward algebra shows that (10) implies (1) for all N . Furthermore,
the proof of Proposition 1 shows that (2) is implied by (10) if E[u˜|v˜] = E[u˜]
holds. It thus remains to show that (10) implies E[u˜|v˜] = E[u˜].
For all N ∈ IN, let
w˜N = −
√
N√
N + 1
u˜∗ +
1√
N + 1
v˜∗, z˜N =
1√
N + 1
u˜∗ +
√
N√
N + 1
v˜∗.
For any bounded continuous function g : IR → IR condition (10) implies
E[w˜Ng(z˜N )] = 0 for all N .
The sequence of random variables w˜Ng(z˜N ) converges pointwise to−u˜∗g(v˜∗)
and is dominated by the integrable random variable sup |g| · (|u˜∗| + |v˜∗|).
Hence, by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem ([5], Theorem 16.4),
E[−u˜∗g(v˜∗)] = 0 for any bounded continuous function g. Consequently,
E[u˜∗|v˜∗] = 0, hence E[u˜|v˜] = E[u˜].
Proof of Remark 1:
By Theorem 6.1.1. in Lukacs and Laha [13], (13) holds if and only if
∀η ∈ (0, 2pi), r ∈ IR : E[(− sin ηu˜∗ + cos ηv˜∗)eir(cos ηu˜∗+sin ηv˜∗)] = 0,
or, equivalently,
∀η ∈ (0, 2pi), r ∈ IR :
− sin ηΦ1,0(r cos η, r sin η) + cos ηΦ0,1(r cos η, r sin η) = 0, (20)
where Φ1,0 and Φ0,1 denote the first-order partial derivatives of the char-
acteristic function Φ of (u˜∗, v˜∗). By the chain rule, (20) is equivalent to
the condition that the partial derivative of F (r, η) = Φ(r cos η, r sin η) with
respect to the polar angle η is identical to zero for all r ∈ IR, which is equiv-
alent to the condition that the characteristic function of (u˜∗, v˜∗), and thus
the distribution of (u˜∗, v˜∗), is rotation invariant.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Let Φ denote the characteristic function of
(u˜∗, v˜∗). The characteristic function Φη of the rotated random vector (u˜∗η, v˜∗η)
is then given by
Φη(s, t) = E[eis(cos ηu˜
∗+sin ηv˜∗)+it(− sin ηu˜∗+cos ηv˜∗)]
= Φ(s cos η − t sin η, s sin η + t cos η). (21)
Because all moments exist for (u˜∗, v˜∗), all moments exist for (u˜∗η, v˜∗η) and
these moments are determined by the higher order partial derivatives of the
characteristic functions Φ(s, t) and Φη(s, t) at (0, 0). I.e., it is sufficient to
show
∀η ∈ IR, m, n ∈ IN0 : Φηm,n(0, 0) = Φm,n(0, 0), (22)
where here (and in the following) we use notation such as Φm,n to denote
(higher order) partial derivatives.
Applying Theorem 6.1.1 in [13] as in the proof of Remark 1 it follows
that (12) is equivalent to
∀η ∈ A, r ∈ IR :
− sin ηΦ1,0(r cos η, r sin η) + cos ηΦ0,1(r cos η, r sin η) = 0. (23)
Substituting sˆ = s cos η and tan η = sin η/ cos η (note that cos(η) 6= 0 for all
η ∈ A), we can rewrite (23) as
∀sˆ ∈ IR, η ∈ A : f(sˆ, tan ηsˆ) = 0,
where for all sˆ, tˆ ∈ IR
f(sˆ, tˆ) = −tˆΦ1,0(sˆ, tˆ) + sˆΦ0,1(sˆ, tˆ).
We thus have
∀sˆ ∈ IR, η ∈ A, k ∈ IN0 : d
k
dsˆk
f(sˆ, tan ηsˆ) = 0. (24)
Using induction over k, we can rewrite (24) in terms of the higher order
partial derivatives fm,n to obtain:
∀k ∈ IN0, sˆ ∈ IR, η ∈ A :
k∑
i=0
(tan η)i
(
k
i
)
fk−i,i(sˆ, tan ηsˆ) = 0.
For sˆ = 0, the left side of this equation is a polynomial in tan η. Because
{tan η | η ∈ A} is infinite, the polynomial has infinitely many zeros and is
therefore identically zero; i.e., we have
∀m,n ∈ IN0 : fm,n(0, 0) = 0. (25)
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Because the characteristic function Φη satisfies (21) it is straightforward to
verify that
∀s, t, η ∈ IR : ∂
∂η
Φη(s, t) = f(sˆ(s, t, η), tˆ(s, t, η)), (26)
where
sˆ(s, t, η) = s cos η − t sin η, tˆ(s, t, η) = s sin η + t cos η.
The chain rule and induction over m+ n imply that
∂m
∂sm
∂n
∂tn
f(sˆ(s, t, η), tˆ(s, t, η))
is a linear combination of
{fk,l(sˆ(s, t, η), tˆ(s, t, η)) | k + l ≤ m+ n}.
This together with (sˆ(0, 0, η), tˆ(0, 0, η)) = (0, 0) and (25) implies that
∂m
∂sm
∂n
∂tn
f(sˆ(s, t, η), tˆ(s, t, η))
∣∣∣∣
(s,t,η)=(0,0,η)
= 0. (27)
From (26) and (27) we get
∀m,n ∈ IN0, η ∈ IR : ∂
∂η
Φηm,n(0, 0) = 0,
which implies (22).
Appendix B: Correlation
Let σuv = Cov[u˜, v˜] 6= 0. We exclude the trivial special case of perfect
correlation; i.e., we assume that |σuv| < σuσv.
Proposition 1 remains true, albeit with different values for αN , βN , λN
and µN . To see this, note that (14) still holds, hence we can still conclude
that E[u˜|v˜] is an affine function of v˜, implying
E[u˜|v˜] = σuv
σ2v
(v˜ − E[v˜]) + E[u˜].
Now the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1 can be used to compute
the parameter values αN , βN , λN and µN . In particular, one finds that
λN =
−(N − 1)σuv +
√
(N − 1)2σ2uv + 4
(
σ2uv
σ2v
+ (N + 1)2σ2u
(
1− σ2uv
σ2uσ
2
v
))
Nσ2v
2
(
σ2uv
σ2v
+ (N + 1)2σ2u
(
1− σ2uv
σ2uσ
2
v
)) .
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One then works with the normalized random variable v˜∗ and the normalized
uncorrelated part of u˜∗,
z˜∗ =
1√
1− σ2uv
σ2uσ
2
v
(
u˜∗ − σuv
σuσv
v˜∗
)
,
to find the following necessary and sufficient condition parallel to (10) for
the existence of a linear equilibrium for all N :
E
 −γN√
γ2N + δ
2
N
v˜∗ +
δN√
γ2N + δ
2
N
z˜∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣ δN√γ2N + δ2N v˜
∗ +
γN√
γ2N + δ
2
N
z˜∗
 = 0 ∀N ∈ IN,
where
γN = σv − λN σuv
σv
, δN = λN (N + 1)σu
√
1− σ
2
uv
σ2uσ
2
v
.
Once one has shown that the set of angles replacing A,
A′ = {η ∈ (0, 2pi) | ∃N ∈ IN : γN√
γ2N + δ
2
N
= sin η}
is infinite, the remaining analysis is parallel to the uncorrelated case: it
follows that the moments of (v˜∗, z˜∗) are rotation invariant, hence (u˜, v˜) is
elliptic if it is determined by its moments.
To show that A′ is infinite, it is sufficient to prove the following two
claims:
γN > 0 for all sufficiently large N, (28)
γN√
γ2N + δ
2
N
→ 0 as N →∞. (29)
A straightforward computation shows that, as N →∞,
λN
√
N → σv
σu
√
1− σ2uv
σ2uσ
2
v
> 0.
Hence, γN → σv and δN →∞, from which (28) and (29) are immediate.
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